

# CONFIDENTIAL

## STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Results of 25th Infantry Division operations; 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969.

### Division Losses

Killed in action	- 236	
Wounded in action	- 3955 (669 evac)	
Missing in action	- none	<i>should be 1?</i>
Helicopters destroyed	- 10	
Helicopters damaged	- 18	
Armored Personnel Carriers destroyed	- <del>2</del>	87
Armored Personnel Carriers damaged	- 29	
Tanks destroyed	- <del>1</del>	9
Tanks damaged	- 15	
Trucks destroyed	- <del>1</del>	25
Trucks damaged	- 29	
Rome Flows destroyed	- 2	
Rome Flows damaged	- 17	
Bulldozers damaged	- 3	
Truck-trailers damaged	- 2	
105mm howitzer destroyed	- 1	

### Enemy Losses

Killed in action (body count)	- 1688
Prisoners-of-war	- 123
Hoi Chanh	- 26
Detainees	- 1,580
Individual weapons captured and destroyed	- 548
Crew served weapons captured and destroyed	- 127
Documents captured	- 342 pounds
Rice captured and destroyed	- 182.39 tons
Small arms rounds captured and destroyed	- 703,216
Medical supplies captured and destroyed	- 309 1/2 pounds
Salt captured and destroyed	- 18,395 pounds
Radios captured	- 14
Telephones captured	- 8
Grenades captured and destroyed	- 2,292
Motorcycles captured	- 3
Bicycles captured and destroyed	- 94
H K rounds captured and destroyed	- 2935
Rockets captured and destroyed	- 10
Gas masks captured and destroyed	- 79
Outboard motors captured and destroyed	- 17
RPG rounds captured and destroyed	- 807
Mines captured and destroyed	- 653
RPG boosters captured and destroyed	- 209
Cluster bomb units destroyed	- 46
Gasoline destroyed	- 2,175 gallons
Plasters captured	- 100,000 P

Tab B

154

CONFIDENTIAL

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Structures destroyed	- 559
Fortifications destroyed	- 8,081
Tunnels destroyed	- 164
Sampans destroyed	- 224

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCPE

6 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for 25th Infantry Division ACofS, G1 Section  
for period ending 31 January 1969, AVDCPE

Historian  
25th Infantry Division  
APO 96225

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

Personnel:

(a) During the months of November, December, and January the aggregate Division personnel strength averaged 17,479 authorized or 100.9%. Enlisted personnel strength for this period averaged 16,320 of 16,199 authorized or 100.7%, while officer personnel strength for the period averaged 1318 of 1280 authorized or 102.9%. Personnel shortages continued to exist in Infantry Captains and Infantry, Artillery and Engineer Non-Commissioned Officers in the grade of E5 and E6.

(b) During the period 1 November through 31 January 1969 the Division had 268 KIA's (23 officers and 245 EM) and 1959 WIA's (144 officers and 1815 EM). There were 18 non-battle deaths, 21 non-battle injuries and 13 missing in action. Officer gains for the period numbered 486 while administrative officer losses were 335. EM gains were 5331 while administrative EM losses totaled 3848.

(c) Principal Command and Staff - The identification of the principal command and staff personnel within the 25th Infantry Division for the reporting period is as follows:

Commanding General

Major General Ellis W. Williamson

Assistant Division Commander (M)

Brigadier General Glen C. Long Jr.  
(1 Nov - 30 Dec)

Brigadier General Carleton Preer Jr.  
(31 Dec - 31 Jan)

Tab C

156

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Assistant Division Commander (S)	Brigadier General Carleton Preer Jr. (1 Nov - 30 Dec)
	Brigadier General Edwin F. Black (31 Dec - 31 Jan)
Chief of Staff	Colonel Gordon Sumner Jr.
ACofS, G-1	LTC Donald F. Hockett (5 Jan - 31 Jan)
	LTC Harry Rubin (1 Nov - 4 Jan)
ACofS, G-2	LTC Albert Stubblebine (1 Nov - 15 Nov)
	LTC Edmund R. Thompson (16 Nov - 31 Jan)
ACofS, G-3	LTC George E. Taylor
ACofS, G-4	LTC Thomas E. Williams
ACofS, G-5	LTC Vincent I. Brosky
Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade	Colonel Robert L. Fair
Commanding Officer, 2nd Brigade	Colonel Eugene M. Lynch (1 Nov - 30 Jan)
	Colonel Homer S. Long (31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 3rd Brigade	Colonel Lewis J. Ashley (1 Nov - 30 Nov)
	Colonel Louis J. Scheiter (1 Dec - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, DIVARTY	Colonel Lucius G. Hill
Commanding Officer, DISCOM	Colonel James R. Brownell (1 Nov - 26 Nov)
	Colonel James W. Atwell (27 Nov - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 725th Maint Bn	LTC George L. Ford
Commanding Officer, 25th S&T Bn	LTC John K. Henderson

## CONFIDENTIAL

Commanding Officer, 12th Signal Bn	LTC John W. So.let
Commanding Officer, 25th Aviation Bn	LTC Kenneth Burton
Commanding Officer, 65th Engineer Bn	LTC James W. Atwell (1 Nov - 4 Dec)
	LTC Edward C. Gibson (5 Dec - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 4/9 Infantry	LTC Charles S. Snowden (1 Nov - 30 Nov)
	LTC Leo L. Wilson (1 Dec - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 2/14 Infantry	LTC William Cummings
Commanding Officer, 4/23 Infantry	LTC Clifford C. Neilson (1 Nov - 12 Nov)
	LTC Albert C. Butler (13 Nov - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 1/27 Infantry	LTC Mark L. Reese (1 Nov - 17 Dec)
	LTC David S. Meredith (18 Dec - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 2/27 Infantry	LTC John F. Kenney Jr. (1 Nov - 13 Nov)
	LTC Vincent J. Oddi Jr. (14 Nov - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 1/5 Infantry	LTC William E. Klein
Commanding Officer 2/12 Infantry	LTC Thomas F. Dreisonstok
Commanding Officer, 3/22 Infantry	LTC Alexander H. Hunt
Commanding Officer, 2/22 Infantry	LTC James A. Damon (1 Nov - 30 Nov)
	LTC Ralph M. Cline (1 Dec - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 2/34 Armor	LTC Theodore E. O'Connor (1 Nov - 19 Jan)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Commanding Officer, 3/4 Cavalry	LTC Duane R. Tague (20 Jan - 31 Jan)
	LTC Clemmens A. Riley (1 Nov - 26 Nov)
Commanding Officer, 1/8 Artillery	LTC Robert S. Mc Gowan (27 Nov - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 7/11 Artillery	LTC John P. Cooper
	LTC Forest E. Pierce (1 Nov - 14 Nov)
	LTC Walter A. Wood (15 Nov - 31 Jan)
Commanding Officer, 3/13 Artillery	LTC Paul Donovan
Commanding Officer, 2/77 Artillery	LTC Vernon B. Lewis
Adjutant General	LTC William F. Faught
Chaplain	LTC Duncan C. Stewart
Finance Officer	LTC George B. Barrett
Information Officer	MAJ Andrew J. Sullivan
Inspector General	MAJ Otis G. Wilson (1 Nov - 5 Nov)
	MAJ James Trimble (6 Nov - 2 Dec)
	LTC James T. Bradley (3 Dec - 15 Dec)
	LTC John E. Mann (16 Dec - 31 Jan)
Judge Advocate	LTC Jack Norton
Provost Marshal	LTC Malcolm R. Smith
Surgeon	LTC Robert L. Reid

**2. Section 2, Lesson Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:**

**Personnel and Administration:**

159

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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(a) **OBSERVATION:** The Infantry Division MTOE does not take into consideration the support personnel requirements that are necessitated by the operation of 3 permanent base camps.

(b) **EVALUATION:** To adequately perform such base camp functions as operation of the Post Exchange, Ice Cream Plant, Hold Baggage Office, Labor Office, and the Installation Coordinator's Office, the 25th Infantry Division has had to provide 15 officers and 120 enlisted men from its own personnel resources.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That an adequate TD be authorized to man non-tactical related base camp support functions.

D. F. HOCKETT  
LTC, GS  
ACofS, G1

160

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY **CONFIDENTIAL**  
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCIN

3 February 1969

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report of the ACofS, G2 for period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969.

Commanding General  
25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDCMH  
APO 96225

1. (C) Section 1. Significant Activities.

a. During the reporting period LTC A.N. Stubblebine was replaced by LTC Edmund R. Thompson as ACofS, G2; MAJ Clifford J. Fralen remained as Deputy G2 and SGM Thomas F. Maloney remained as SGM, G2. MAJ Anthony J. Gally was replaced by MAJ George B. Sweet III as the MID Commander, MAJ William E. Cates, and later MAJ Ralph A. Mason Jr, became the G2 Plans Officer. MAJ Larry G. Quinn was replaced by MAJ Ralph A. Mason Jr, and later by MAJ William E. Cates as the G2 Operations Officer. CPT Kenneth D. McArthur was replaced by CPT Allen N. Knox as G2 Air. MAJ Sweet was replaced by CPT John P. Seawell as Chief of the IPW Section, CPT George E. Pickett Jr. was replaced by CPT Robert E. Thomas Jr. as the Chief of the Order of Battle Section, CPT Dennis P. Koehler remained as the CI Section Chief, 1LT Richard C. Whitney remained as the II Section Chief.

b. During November, December and January, the enemy has avoided contact whenever possible and continued to place his efforts on training in rear base areas, replacing his losses from August and September attacks in Tay Ninh Province and establishing food and arms caches in his forward bases. Also, the enemy continued reconnaissance of US, ARVN and civilian installations throughout the 25th Inf Div TAOI.

c. In December and January, SR-II units were generally forced to abstain from combat operations in order to maintain traditional LOCs and provide support to rear service elements. The primary obstacle to enemy supply activities was the 1st Brigade, 1st US Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) which operated in the Plain of Reeds west of the Vam Co Dong River from mid December to late January.

d. On 13-14 November, 95C NVA Regiment, newly infiltrated from II Corps into the Fishhook, attacked Allied Forces at FSB Dot (vic XT 5684) resulting in 290 KIA (BC). After moving into the Crescent in early December, the 95C attacked a 25th Infantry Division Convoy (XT 430450)

Tab D

161

**CONFIDENTIAL**



## CONFIDENTIAL

on 17 December resulting in 73 KIA (BC). Again on 10 and 14 January, the 95C attacked 25th Infantry Division convcys in the Ben Cui Plantation resulting in 14 and 122 KIA (BC) respectively.

e. In December and January, the action in the TAOR was centered primarily in the Citadel area with the 88th, 101st, 268, and Quyét Thang Regiments being identified in contact. On 17 January 3rd Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry (vic XT 513353) contacted the 2nd Battalion, 268 VC/NVA Regiment resulting in 46 KIA (BC). Additional information captured during this period revealed that the 268 Regiment was reorganized, and the 7th Battalion Cu Chi became the 3rd Battalion, 268 VC/NVA Regiment.

f. During the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969, a total of 700 detainees were interrogated and processed by the IPW Section, 25th MID. These included: 323 Innocent Civilians, 105 VCS-CD (Supporters-Civil Defendants), 56 VCI-CD (Infrastructure-Civil Defendants), 9 VCG-PW (Guerrilla PWs), 30 VCI-PW (Infrastructure-PW), 42 VC-PW, 19 NVA-PWs and 9 returnees.

g. The majority of the VCI captured were taken out of Duc Hoa District, Hau Nghia Province. The principal friendly forces involved were the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry and the 25th MI Detachment VCI Exploitation Team. During the period, 1 November 68 through 31 January 69, more than 147 VCI were captured, 16 KIA and 1 were influenced to Chieu Hoi. The VCI team is believed to have been largely responsible for the cancellation of two major VC attacks on 25 December 68; one against the Hoc Mon Engineering Compound and a sapper attack in Saigon. More than 70 VCI Sapper and Intelligence personnel were apprehended and 4 were killed in the Saigon area by joint operations conducted by the VCI Exploitation Team and VN Navy MSS personnel. During this same period, several large ammo and weapons caches were discovered and subsequently destroyed or evacuated by the VCI Exploitation Team.

h. The G2 Air requested, coordinated and reported information from visual reconnaissance and imagery interpretation to include IR and SLAR sensors. During November, December and January, 61, 65 and 48 photography requests, respectively were processed. The general support phase I of the Mowhawk Evaluation Test, which began in December, was a continuation of conditions which had existed previously. Phase III, direct support, began 19 January, following a short transition phase. During phase III, direct support has been provided to the Division by the consolidation at Vung Tau of the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company and the ASL Platoons from the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. The direct support concept has greatly increased the Mowhawk operational responsiveness. facilitated control and permitted habitual association between OV-1 Mohawk personnel and Division intelligence personnel.

i. During the period from 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969, members of the Counterintelligence Section developed information concerning exploitable targets consisting of Viet Cong and Viet Cong Infrastructure personalities, installations, activities, arms/supply caches, and tunnel complexes. The information obtained resulted in 31 combat operations in which CI personnel participated. CI personnel continued to expand their confidential informat

162

## CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

network, adding a new dimension by developing potential sources through participation in MEDCAP operations. More effective coverage in the BAO TRAI area was effected by assigning a CI agent to reside in BAO TRAI. Base security was enhanced in several ways: MI teams at CU CHI, TAY NINH, and DAU TIENG Base Camp began developing base informant nets among the Vietnamese employees working on the bases. CI personnel began making periodic checks throughout base camp areas looking for unattended indigenous and photographs. Gate checks using Hoi Chanhs as spotters for possible VC members working on base camp were instituted. Classes were given to S2s and S2 clerks in the proper methods for requesting security investigations and clearances. During the reporting period, CI Section personnel also coordinated extensive investigations with CID personnel into various incidents. CI personnel completed comprehensive physical security surveys of the BA BEP Bridge and the DAU TIENG Bridge.

J. During the period from November 68 to January 69, the Imagery Interpretation Section underwent many changes. The end result was an increase in response time in the field of photo, SLAR, and Infra-red Imagery. Most of these changes were due to the Army Mohawk Evaluation Test which was being conducted. On 25 December 1968 the II Section received the ES-38 Portable Dark Room. On 13 January 1969 the Infra-red data-link station arrived. On 14 January 1969 both the dark room and data-link station became operational. The first direct support photo mission was received by the data-link station on 17 January 1969. On the same day the II Section moved to new building with the OB Section.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

163

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(1) During this period the Imagery Interpretation Section accomplished the following:

TARGETING DATA FOR ARCLIGHT AND COMBAT SKY SPOTS		PHOTO MOSAICS	AREA STUDIES
NOV.	120	100	71
DEC.	152	118	96
JAN.	12	130	55
PHOTO READOUTS		MISC. PROJECTS	
NOV.	81	36	
DEC.	67	18	
JAN.	55	53	

(2) During the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969, a total of 700 detainees were interrogated and processed by the IPW Section. These personnel were classified as follows:

IC	323
VCS-CD	105
VCI-PW	56
VCG-PW	9
VCI-PW	30
VC-PW	42
NVA-PW	19
Returnees	9
	<u>TOTAL 700</u>

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### A. Intelligence.

#### (1) Possible terrorist activities on base camps.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Extensive security measures are normally in effect to protect material, equipment and supplies against sabotage attempts. Less detailed attention is usually given to the protection of the individual soldier while he is in an area normally considered to be secure from infiltration by the enemy. Recurring reports indicated that the enemy has or intends to establish sapper units on base camps among indigenous employees.

(b) **EVALUATION:** From incidents of the past several months, it appears that troop facilities, such as the mess halls and clubs, are more prone to terrorist activities than the sabotage of material.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Recommend that stringent measures be instituted down to the lowest echelon to assure that troop facilities are closely inspected for boobytraps, fire hazards and any unnecessary obstructions which might lend concealment to explosives and/or incendiaries.

#### (2) Dissemination of order of battle information.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** An efficient method of disseminating Order of Battle (OB) information on enemy units operating in our TACI was needed.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Over a period of four months the OB Section produced 14 unit studies. These studies gave a complete unit history, the tactics employed, personalities and codes and LBNs of the particular unit. The studies were the result of efforts of the OB personnel and were completed in addition to their assigned duties. Information for the reports was extracted from the out file system, OB books, and the file systems of contiguous units. Upon completion of the studies, they were reproduced and disseminated to all applicable units.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** This type of report be considered by other OB Sections for a method of cataloguing and disseminating intelligence.

#### (3) Use of OB analysts at brigade level.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Timely OB analysis was needed at brigade level to facilitate the ability of immediate reaction.

(b) **EVALUATION:** At the beginning of January, two OB analysts were assigned to the brigades. One man to the 1st Brigade and one man to the 3rd Brigade. The men were experienced analysts who had a broad knowledge of OB functions and procedures. We now have an experienced flow of information through daily communications. A capability for immediate readouts of captured documents and agent reports is now available to the brigades from these analysts. Identification of enemy units in contact can be expeditiously forwarded to the OB Section for confirmation or further analysis.

165

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

(b) RECOMMENDATION: This system be used when brigades have operational headquarters located away from the Division Intelligence Detachments which contain the Order of Battle Section.

### (4) Analysis of agent reports.

(a) OBSERVATION: A more thorough analysis of agent reports was needed.

(b) EVALUATION: The G2 Plans Section in cooperation with the II Section analyzes all agent reports by checking the SLAR, Red Haze, Sniff and SPAR returns from the area of the agent reports. Any codes, LBNs or personalities mentioned in the report are checked against OB files. This complete evaluation along with Order of Battle Comments is entered into the daily INTSUM.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This procedure should be considered for utilization by other OB Sections in SVN, as it provides a reliable method for confirming or denying the many agent reports received by the G2 Section.

### (5) Recording of Local Force information.

(a) OBSERVATION: A more efficient system was needed for the recording of Local Force information.

(b) EVALUATION: In December the OB Section began to record Local Force data on 5x8 cards. This card system gives the section an ability to recall information accurately and without hesitation. The cards were utilized in the preparation of Local Force study for the G2 and will be used as a basis for evaluating information. Additionally, they will be used as a basis for suggesting possible targets for exploitation by the Division maneuver elements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that other OB Sections investigate the feasibility of using the OB card file to accumulate data on Local Force Units.

### (6) Dissemination of data from captured documents.

(a) OBSERVATION: Readouts of captured documents were not receiving wide dissemination.

(b) EVALUATION: Translated documents that are received from the IPW Section are analyzed for OB information (eg. unit identifications and other tactically exploitable information) and the results are published in the daily INTSUM. This type of dissemination gives the capturing unit the ability to see the results of its efforts in collecting enemy documents. The units in the field are prime benefactors of this expanded reporting and will now receive the results of their document inventories through the INTSUM.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other OB Sections consider utilizing this technique.

166

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

### (7) Enemy indirect fire techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy mortar and rocket fire directed against US fixed installations is normally conducted from sites located on or in the immediate vicinity of prominent terrain features.

(b) EVALUATION: An analysis of VC/NVA indirect firing procedures based on radar sightings, shell reps, plus information provided by ralliers and PWs revealed that over 95% of all the mortar and rocket attacks conducted against 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division fixed installations during the reporting period were initiated from sites located on or no more than 300 meters from roads, road junctions and/or streams. The principal reasons for this are (1) mathematical firing data computations are more accurate when rendered from known locations, (2) safety and speedy egress from the firing site.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Counter battery programs should be concentrated on these likely sites. Countermortar radars should increase targeting along streams, roads, and road junctions. Counter-battery air surveillance should be concentrated on suspected sites.

### (8) Multiple counter battery programs.

(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy mortar and rocket fire being directed at fixed US installations is not being effectively neutralized by counter-battery fire.

(b) EVALUATION: VC/NVA mortar and rocket elements have repeatedly initiated indirect fire attacks at fixed US installations without suffering significant casualties. Enemy reconnaissance has been successful in establishing the pattern of our counter battery program after it had been fired a couple of times. Consequently, enemy forces choose firing sites which are relatively safe from our counter battery initiated fires.

### (9) Enemy indirect fire analysis.

(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy indirect fire attacks against US fire support bases and base camps correspond to periods when personnel on these facilities are most vulnerable.

(b) EVALUATION: Pattern analysis of the time frames during which indirect fire attacks were conducted against 3rd Brigade installations indicated that these attacks occurred primarily during the hours 1000 to 1300 and 1700 to 2000. Most of the PX facilities open at mid-morning and there is a tendency for people to move about more at this time. This is also the case during early evening. Units return to fire support bases and base camps, consequently troop density is increased. Likewise there is a natural inclination for soldiers to be more relaxed and congregate to a greater extent.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Increase counter battery surveillance during periods of increased vulnerability - 1900h to 1330h and 1700h to 200h. Keep personnel from congregating during these time frames.

(10) Cover and deception for command APCs.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The enemy has displayed a consistent ability to discern command APCs from other vehicles in mechanized formations.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The enemies ability to pick out command tracks as targets to fire RPGs upon is believed to be directly attributed to the tell-tale presence of those two radio antennae on each command vehicle, as opposed to the single antenna found on other armored personnel carriers.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** All non-command APC's should be equipped with an additional dummy antenna.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCOP

3 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the ACOFS, G3 for Period 1 November 1968  
to 31 January 1969

Commanding General,  
25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDCMH  
APO 96225

1. (C) Section 1. Significant Activities.

a. General. The G3 section of the 25th Infantry Division under the guidance of the ACOFS, LTC George E. Taylor, continued to plan and coordinate the actions necessary for the Division to continue operations against the VC/NVA throughout the reporting period. LTC Taylor was aided by LTC Tilford C. Creel and MAJ Frederick H. Borneman.

b. The G-3 operations section, under the guidance of Major Richard E. Bauchspies, coordinated the daily plans and operations of the 25th Infantry and its attached and supporting units. Major Bauchspies tour of duty in Vietnam was completed in January 1969 and he was succeeded by Major Ronald C. Meeks. Assisting in the DTOC were Major Aubrey J. Hol-loway, Major Kent E. Harrison, Major George W. Heath and 1LT Robert A. Newman as assistant operations officers. Additionally Lieutenants Howard M. King, Gary R. Nelson, Roger A. Seo, provided invaluable information as Liaison Officers to 25th ARVN Division, 5th ARVN Division, and II FFORCEV respectively. Established during the reporting period was a DTOC Forward at Tay Ninh East under the guidance of Major Nathaniel R. Roache, assisted by Captain William C. Hopkins and Lieutenant Ozzie Corbin as assistant operations officers.

c. The organization list of the 25th Infantry Division for the period 1 November to 31 January is as follows:

ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED UNITS

ASSIGNED: HHC, 25th Inf Div  
HHC, 1st Brigade  
HHC, 2nd Brigade  
HHC, 3rd Brigade  
HH3, Division Artillery

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

Tab E

169

**CONFIDENTIAL**



# CONFIDENTIAL

## ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED UNITS

HHC & Band (Division Support Command)  
3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry  
25th Aviation Battalion  
65th Engineer Battalion  
125th Signal Battalion  
2nd Battalion, 34th Armor  
25th Military Police Company  
Company F, 50th Infantry (LRP)  
1st Battalion, 27th Infantry  
2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry  
2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry  
2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry  
3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry  
4th Battalion, 9th Infantry  
1st Battalion, 5th (Mech) Infantry  
2nd Battalion, 22nd (Mech) Infantry  
4th Battalion, 23rd (Mech) Infantry  
1st Battalion, 8th Artillery  
3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery  
7th Battalion, 11th Artillery  
2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery  
66th Infantry Platoon (Tracker Dog)  
38th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)  
44th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)  
46th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)  
25th Administration Company  
25th Supply & Transport Battalion  
25th Medical Battalion  
725th Maintenance Battalion  
9th Chemical Detachment  
15th PI Detachment  
20th PI Detachment  
25th MI Detachment  
18th Military History Detachment  
372d RR Co  
319th Avn Det  
341st Avn Det

### ATTACHED:

d. Training. Training within the 25th Infantry Division under the staff supervision of the Doctrine, Organization and Training (DOT) section of G3. LTC Willis S. Rosing, assisted by MAJ Jean C. Leger, MAJ George T. Talbot and MAJ Merritte H. Wilson, continued in charge of G3 (DOT). The Lightning Reinforcement Training Center, under the command of 1st Lt George W. Vorsell, Commandant, operated the Lightning Reinforcement Training School, the Lightning Combat Leaders Course, and the Lightning Mines, Boobytraps and Tunnel course. The Reinforcement Training School, which is a five day orientation on Vietnam, was completed by 5,071 personnel between 1 November and 31 January 69. The Mines, Boobytraps and Tunnel Course, which is a one day course of instruction on enemy mines, boobytraps and tunnels employed in the Division's TAOI, was completed by

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

6,724 personnel. The ten day field leadership course for fire team and squad leaders conducted by the Lightning Combat Leaders Course (LCLC) graduated 663 students. Other divisional courses of instruction, the instructing unit and the number of trainees for the period of this report are as follows:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>INSTRUCTOR UNIT</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>
Small Army Inspection	725th Maint Bn	75
Generator Maintenance	725th Maint Bn	84
Mess Management	25th S & T Bn	129
Helicopter Load Preparation	25th Avn Bn	129

Selected division personnel also attended specialized courses of instruction offered by nondivisional organization between 1 November 1968 and 31 January 1969. These courses by title, the instructing unit, location and number of trainees are shown below:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>
Airframe Maintenance, UH1-D,C	765th Trans Bn	Vung Tau	3
" " AH-1G	"	"	3
" " UH1-D,H	"	"	6
" " OH-6A	"	"	6
Engine Maintenance T-53-L-11	"	"	6
" " T-53-L-13	"	"	6
Supply	"	"	6
Armament Enlisted #2, XM-28, 18E1.	"	"	6
Armament Officer #2, XM-28, 18E1.	"	"	6
AH1G Transition Training.	334th Hel Co	Bien Ho	6
OH-6A " "	765th Trans Bn	Vung Tau	3
Photographic darkroom ES-38B	1st Mibars	Saigon	2
MACV Records Sch	5th SFG	Nha Trang	21
Cable Splicer	21st Sig Co	Long Binh	4
ANKRC-163, O & M	"	"	1

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<u>COURSE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>
Radio/Relay Carrier Ops	21st Sig Co	Long Binh	1
IM 571 Training	18th Maint Co	"	22
Physical security survey as, 18th MP Bde		"	2

During this reporting period the 2nd Bn 34th Armor Mobile Training Team (MTT) conducted ARVN Infantry Battalion Refresher Training. The 2nd Bn, 7th Regiment satisfactorily completed the 28 day refresher training course.

e. The G-3 Plans section was headed by MAJ Frederick H. Borneman, from 1 Nov 68 until 4 Jan 69; by MAJ Wilburt L. Jenkins, from 4 Jan 69 until 27 Jan 69; and by CPT Ronald L. Cairns, from 27 Jan 69 thru the end of the reporting period. They, MAJ Borneman, MAJ Jenkins & CPT Cairns, were ably assisted by CPT Harry H. Joyner, from 1 Nov 68 until 17 Dec 68, & by CPT Scott L. Sturges from 15 Jan 69, thru the end of the reporting period. During the quarter, the Plans Section continued to plan & coordinate all friendly operations conducted within the 25th Infantry Division TAOI. There were a total of eleven (11) major operation plans published during the quarter. The missions of coordinating areas of operation with the 5th ARVN Division & 25th ARVN Division, coordinating combined operations & providing planning guidance to the Brigades of the Division also were accomplished in a professional manner. Finally, the occupation of the new TOC building, for the Division Forward at Tay Ninh City, required new maps & charts, all of which were prepared by the G-3 Plans section in a highly professional manner.

f. The G-3 (Air) Section. During the period 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69 the 25th Infantry Division operations were supported by 2,785 Tactical Airstrike sorties resulting in 324 KBA (C), 304 KBA (POSS), 4,215 bunkers destroyed, 459 structures destroyed, 91 secondary explosions and 73 secondary fires. In addition the Division was allocated 71 B-52 strikes resulting in 18 KBA (DC), 33 KBA (POSS), 23 secondary explosions, 11 secondary fires, 1181 bunkers destroyed and 66 structures destroyed. Assigned to the G3 Air was MAJ Forrest J. French. The pilots of the USAF TACP were:

LTC Robert Straughan	MAJ John R. Bode
LTC George K. Barsom	CPT Rex M. Stewart
LTC J. C. Lewis	CPT Ronald G. Anderson
LTC Jack H. Leith	CPT Harry F. Barr
MAJ Robert L. Gain	MAJ Herbert W. Evans
CPT Kent Montavon	MAJ Maxwell R. Sidner
MAJ Robert E. Fielding	CPT Prati D. Askworth
MAJ Everett E. Pritchard	MAJ Hubert R. Martin